Houthi Cyber Activities: A Deep Dive into Threats and Influence Operations

The Houthis, a Yemen-based militant group, have escalated their cyber operations, posing significant threats to regional stability and global security, including targeting the United States and its Department of Defense (DoD). This article explores their mobile espionage campaigns, infrastructure tactics, robust influence operations, and key leadership personas, providing actionable insights as of March 17, 2025.

1. Mobile Espionage Campaigns: Houthi Cyber Threats Unveiled

The Houthis leverage mobile malware to infiltrate targets, a growing concern for cybersecurity experts. Veritech Consulting offers tailored defenses against such threats.

• OilAlpha Group: Since April 2022, this Houthi-aligned group deploys SpyNote and SpyMax via WhatsApp, targeting humanitarian organizations like CARE International and Saudi entities to steal credentials and manipulate aid flows [Reference: Recorded Future, “OilAlpha: Pro-Houthi Militant Group Targets Arabian Peninsula with Mobile Malware,” November 14, 2024].
  • The Hacker News: Highlights mobile malware surges in conflict zones [Summary: “Mobile Malware Surge in 2024 Targets Vulnerable Regions,” January 2025].
  • Cybernews: Notes WhatsApp as a spyware vector [Summary: “Cheap Spyware Fuels Cybercrime in the Middle East,” February 2025].
• GuardZoo Malware: Active since 2019, this campaign uses a Dendroid RAT variant to target military personnel across Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Oman (450+ victims), extracting photos, documents, and mapping files [Reference: Lookout, “GuardZoo: Houthi-Aligned Mobile Malware Targets Middle Eastern Military Personnel,” August 2022].
  • Malpedia: Lists GuardZoo as Iran-backed [Summary: “Dendroid RAT and Variants,” accessed March 2025].
  • OTX AlienVault: Ties GuardZoo to military lures [Summary: “GuardZoo Malware Indicators,” updated February 2025].

Table 1: OilAlpha vs. GuardZoo – Houthi Cyber Threats Compared

2. Infrastructure and Tactics: Decoding Houthi Cyber Operations

The Houthis exploit local infrastructure for cyberattacks, a tactic organizations can counter with advanced network security solutions.

• Yemeni Infrastructure: Utilizing Yemen’s Public Telecommunication Corporation and dynamic DNS, the Houthis power operations like OilAlpha [Reference: Recorded Future, November 14, 2024].
  • ISC SANS Data Links: Notes dynamic DNS abuse in conflict zones [Summary: “Dynamic DNS in Cyber Operations,” March 2025].
  • CISA News-Events: Warns of telecom exploitation [Summary: “Telecom Infrastructure Risks,” January 2025].
• Social Engineering: OilAlpha and GuardZoo use WhatsApp to deceive users [Reference: Lookout, August 2022].
  • SecurityWeek: Highlights Middle East social engineering trends [Summary: “Social Engineering Trends in 2025,” February 2025].

3. Influence Operations: Houthi Propaganda Tactics Analyzed

Houthi influence operations blend digital and traditional media to shape narratives and destabilize adversaries—a key focus for Veritech Consulting’s disinformation defense strategies.

• Control of Digital Space:
  • YemenNet and “.ye” Domain: Since 2014, the Houthis control Yemen’s ISP and domain, filtering content and managing online presence [Reference: Middle East Institute, “The Houthis’ Media Machine: Propaganda and Influence in Yemen,” January 2023].
  • Social Media Campaigns: Twitter/X campaigns with prewritten tweet boards flood hashtags (e.g., #USHandsOffYemen) during 2023-2024 Red Sea attacks, framing U.S./U.K. actions as imperialist [Reference: CyberWire Daily Briefing, “Iranian Proxies Amplify Online Influence,” March 10, 2025].
    • Eurepoc Table View: Tracks Houthi Twitter bots with slogans like “Death to America” [Summary: “Influence Operations Database,” accessed March 2025].
    • X Activity: @AnsarallahYemen posts (March 15, 2025) claim U.S. asset victories with doctored media.
• Traditional Media:
  • Al-Masirah TV: Trusted by 60% in Houthi areas, it broadcasts anti-Western narratives from Sanaa and Beirut [Reference: Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, “Yemen’s Information War: The Houthi Media Strategy,” March 2024].
  • Radio and Print: Rural outreach glorifies leaders and vilifies the U.S.-Saudi coalition.
• Propaganda Goals:
  • Domestic Legitimacy: Spinning 2024 Red Sea ops as strength with slogans like “The Americans will not defeat us.”
  • International Support: 2023-2025 Red Sea attacks align with Palestine, gaining traction on Telegram and X [Source: X Post, @HouthiMedia, November 2024].
  • Psychological Warfare: Exaggerated claims (e.g., MQ-9 Reaper downing, March 2025) undermine U.S. credibility [Source: X Post, @MutahirMustafa_, March 16, 2025].
• Tactics and Execution:
  • Content Creation: Iranian/Hezbollah-assisted videos (e.g., 2024 U.S. warship hit, 500,000 views) spread via YouTube and X [Reference: Middle East Institute, January 2023].
  • Disinformation: False U.S. bio-weapons lab claims persist despite debunking [Reference: Sana’a Center, March 2024].
  • Iranian Coordination: IRGC-style hashtag hijacking enhances reach [Reference: CyberWire, March 10, 2025].

Table 2: Houthi Influence Tools for Cybersecurity Analysis

4. Personas of Key Leaders: OilAlpha and GuardZoo

Understanding leadership is critical for countering Houthi cyber threats—Veritech Consulting excels in threat actor profiling.

• OilAlpha Leader: “The Humanitarian Manipulator”
  • Profile: Mid-30s to 40s male, Arabic-speaking, Sanaa-based, with Iranian technical training.
  • Background: Ex-IT professional turned Houthi operative, possibly linked to IRGC cyber units.
  • Motivation: Controls aid via NGO targeting, anti-Western zeal.
  • Tactics: WhatsApp malware, SpyNote/SpyMax deployment [Reference: Recorded Future, November 14, 2024].
• GuardZoo Leader: “The Military Tracker”
  • Profile: Late 20s to 30s male, Yemen-based, military background.
  • Background: Houthi loyalist with Iranian-supplied coding skills.
  • Motivation: Tracks military movements for tactical advantage.
  • Tactics: GuardZoo with military lures, custom C2 backend [Reference: Lookout, August 2022].

Table 4: OilAlpha and GuardZoo Leader Personas

5. External Support: Iran’s Role in Houthi Cyber Threats

Iranian backing amplifies Houthi capabilities—Veritech Consulting tracks state-sponsored threats.

• OilAlpha may involve Iranian operators; ISTAR data aids maritime attacks [Reference: Recorded Future, November 14, 2024; Atlantic Council, “Iran’s Role in Yemen’s Cyber and Maritime Operations,” October 2023].
  • MITRE ATT&CK Groups: Links Iran to mobile malware [Summary: “Iranian Threat Groups,” updated March 2025].
  • Google Spreadsheet (CrowdStrike): Notes Iran’s proxy support [Summary: “Adversary Universe Spreadsheet,” accessed March 2025].

6. Strategic Objectives: Why It Matters

• Espionage: Military monitoring [Reference: Lookout, August 2022].
  • ISC SANS Threat Feed: Logs Middle East espionage [Summary: “Threat Feed Updates,” March 2025].
• Aid Manipulation: Targets humanitarian groups [Reference: Recorded Future, November 14, 2024].
• Regional Disruption: Supports Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” [Reference: Atlantic Council, October 2023].

7. History of Houthi Targeting of the U.S. and DoD

The Houthis’ anti-U.S. stance drives physical and cyber aggression— defends against such hybrid threats:

• 2016: Anti-ship missiles at USS Mason and USS Nitze [Source: X Post, @Doha104p3, December 21, 2023].
• 2023-2025: 174 claimed attacks post-October 7, 2023, including USS Mason (November 26, 2023) and destroyers (November 11, 2024) [Sources: The Washington Institute, December 7, 2023; ISW, November 13, 2024; X Post, @tamarahoward, March 16, 2025].
• U.S. Response: Operation Prosperity Guardian (December 2023), strikes in January 2024, B-2 hits in October 2024 [Sources: DoD, February 3, 2024; October 16, 2024].

Table 3: Houthi Attacks on U.S. and DoD Targets

Limitations and Context

Houthi reliance on commodity malware highlights vulnerabilities can be exploited [Reference: Lookout, August 2022].

• CyberNewsWire: Notes proxy group limits [Summary: “Non-State Cyber Actors in 2025,” March 2025].
• CISA Cybersecurity Advisories: Highlights mobile risks [Summary: “Mobile Threat Advisory,” February 2025].

Protect Your Organization with Veritech Consulting

Houthi cyber threats—spanning espionage, influence ops, and U.S./DoD targeting—demand robust cybersecurity solutions. At Veritech Consulting, we provide expert analysis, threat profiling, and defense strategies to safeguard against these and other emerging risks. Contact us at veritech.consulting to secure your future today.